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Introduction
In contemporary accounting, the proliferation of "future-knowing", forward-looking and market-based "economic" accounting technologies is one of the most important developments of the last decade. On the financial accounting side, as Michael Power argues forcefully, the rise of fair value accounting-with measurement methods grounded in financial economics and marketbased, market-simulating valuation processes-brought about the gradual enhancement (and in some cases, displacement) of the traditional, legalistic, transaction-based models of accounting valuation (Power, 2010 ). Yet the new has not simply replaced the old. In Power's view, fair value accounting-and, in general, the "financialization" of accounting-has reinforced the field's "hybrid" character and its existence at the intersection of the "shadow of law" and the "shadow of financial economics".
Looking at innovations in the internal management accounting practices of organizations, we also see a growing preoccupation with the development of leading (as opposed to lagging) performance indicators and the market-based valuations of intangible assets, investment opportunities and risks. Among such emerging performance-valuation practices, risk measurement is of particular interest (Kaplan, 2011) . progression of historical inevitability, but a messy process characterised by halts-and-spurts, setbacks, and a radical open-endedness.
In fact, the rise of fair value and risk measurement reflects much more than the rise of a new technical measurement convention. The parallel stories of the "financialization" of financial accounting (e.g., through fair value accounting) and of management accounting (e.g., through risk measurement) raise Power's crucial question: How and why do some value-measurement technologies 'come to be regarded at specific times and places as more reliable and acceptable than others?' (Power, 2010:198) .
While Power (2009 Power ( , 2010 pinpoints the cultural authority of financial economics as a key condition that gave proponents of fair value and measurement-based risk management institutional support, he acknowledges that a more complete analysis would need to address the role and power of key individuals in shaping the fates of these technologies. Taking on this challenge, I investigate the conditions of possibility-some arising in the institutional environment, some inside organizations (including the roles of key individuals)-that can either support or impede the rise of measurement-based risk management and, by implication, of other control "solutions" in the aftermath of a control failure.
This paper presents a longitudinal field study of a control debacle and its aftermath in the early 2000s at MultiBank, a global financial services firm, and its insurance subsidiary, EurInsurance, itself a multinational company. 4 During the 2002-2003 stock market "correction", EurInsurance was among many European insurance companies that suffered considerable losses on their equity investments. After a series of such market losses forced EurInsurance to disclose write-downs of close to $1 billion each, MultiBank set out to readjust its control grip over its subsidiary. Top management operated multiple divisional controls, drawing on both legalistic, rules-based accounting and financial, market-simulating risk controls. The field study describes how these different control systems were used by top management during the insurance crisis. Of key interest is the stage during which accounting and risk controls came into conflict with each other both conceptually (as they provided management with contradictory pictures of performance) and politically (as their proponents clashed and attempted to undermine each other's credibility).
My research question throughout the study was: Over time, why did different performance measurement technologies shift in and out of top management's focus? Putting it in management control parlance and drawing on Simons' theory of how top managers use performance 4 The company names, for reasons of confidentiality, are disguised. measurement systems (Simons, 1990 (Simons, , 1991 Power (1992) made in the context of the brand accounting debate: Seemingly technical debates about the "right" (most decision-relevant) measurements cannot be abstracted from social questions of the credibility and legitimacy of experts such as accountants and risk experts. In the case of a financial services institution, the "how" of risk and capital management and the "why" of top management's interactive control selection are inextricably linked to the status of "who" executes and propagates the competing control technologies in question.
In the next section I outline three research perspectives that may help us explain how and why certain performance measurement methods (accounting and non-accounting) shift in and out of decision-makers' focus:
The first research perspective examines the information content of performance controls and is predictive in orientation, often containing normative prescriptions as to which performance management models and measures will help decision makers achieve superior performance and strategic direction.
The second perspective is process-oriented and examines the enabling conditions that are necessary to bring certain performance measurements to the attention of decision-makers, particularly when the proponents of control models have to compete with one another for visibility and voice in decision-making.
The third perspective focuses on the institutional appropriateness of particular performance models, positing that proponents of different measurements draw on different institutional logics when creating the internal legitimacy of their preferred method.
Section 3 summarises observations on the financialization of accounting and risk management and outlines some of the institutional logics that are driving this trend. Section 4 sets the scene for the case discussion by introducing the research methods and site, MultiBank's predicament in 2002, the control systems implicated in divisional control and the institutional logics behind these systems. Sections 5-7 relate the longitudinal case, focusing on the dynamics of divisional control, which led to a control rivalry between accounting-measurement-based and financial-risk-measurement-based controls during a period of financial distress and recovery. The concluding section, combining the process perspective with an institutional understanding of the dynamics of multiple control, posits why, in a particular organization, risk measurements may shift in and out of top managerial focus and brings this question into conversation with Simons' theory of interactive control use.
I offer an explanation that combines Simons' model of top management's choice and use of controls with Power's sociology of expertise and the institutional literature on logics of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1989; Thornton et al., 2012) to explain why top managers' choice of interactive controls changes over time.
Behind the seemingly passive controls, there are active controller groups who, in competition for scarce top managerial attention, advance their credentials and claim to provide plausible performance measurement technologies. Like Power's brand valuation techniques, performance measurements are regarded as credible because measurement experts are trusted; to paraphrase Power (1992) , top managers believe in particular control systems because they believe in particular controllers, not the other way around. Hence, the criteria for a top management consensus on control systems are complex and are not determined solely, or even primarily, by the functional logic of the controls in question.
By what, then? Today's complex organizations, responsive to multiple regulatory and investor environments, are operating under diverse institutional expectations and multiplesometimes contradictory-institutional logics. Therefore, competing controller groups need to convince others that their solutions and measurements are responsive to the relevant institutional logic and have institutional appropriateness. I argue that top management's control choice is thus motivated both by the logic of functionalism (relevance) and the logic of appropriateness (legitimacy) of particular controls-and that both of these are socially constructed by the control's proponents.
In the special case of conflicting control systems, when top managers must trade off relevance for appropriateness (or the other way around), their choice of interactive control will be driven by whichever they perceive to be the stronger requirement. In the case of MultiBank, institutional appropriateness was the stronger requirement; the lack of it prevented an otherwise informationally relevant control system from prevailing.
Multiple control systems and top management's control selection
How and why do certain performance measurement methods (accounting and nonaccounting) shift in and out of decision-makers' focus? This question has motivated a longstanding research agenda in management accounting, which can be loosely grouped into three stands: the information content perspective, the process perspective and, most recently, the institutional perspective. This section addresses each in turn.
The information content perspective
Risk measurement doesn't take place in a vacuum. From an information content perspective, risk measurement complements other information systems and control practices, such as costing and resource planning, budgeting and capital allocation, regulatory reporting and performance evaluation (Kaplan, 2011) . The need to explore the design and role of management control systems as part of a broader management control framework has been echoed by many reviewers of the literature (Dent, 1986 (Dent, , 1990 Otley, 1994; Otley et al., 1995; Fisher, 1998; Ittner et al., 2003; Chenhall, 2003) . Many proponents of the multiple-control perspective are motivated by concerns of content as they advocate or examine the effects of "measurement diversity" on firm performance and control. Particularly, the balance scorecard literature (Kaplan and Norton, 1992 , 2000 , 2001 has spurred much interest in the complementarities among financial and nonfinancial performance controls, leading to a continuing strand of inquiry into the incremental and relative information content of new nonfinancial performance measurements vis-à-vis traditional accounting measures. Most of these studies assess the usefulness of nonfinancial measures in terms of their value relevance 5 and test whether nonfinancial indicators, once in the public domain, provide stock market analysts with useful information beyond accounting measures on a firm's future financial prospects (Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner and Larcker, 1998) . Although the jury is still out on whether or not they do (Wiersma, 2006) , there is some empirical evidence that certain nonfinancial control indicators are positively associated with future accounting performance, confirming their incremental information content (Banker et al., 2000; Wiersma, 2006) .
From this perspective, decision-makers (analysts) are endowed with the logic of functionalism 6 (March and Olsen, 1989) in their selection, take-up and use of the diverse performance measurements provided to them. It is assumed that the most useful and robust information systems "will out", based on intrinsic merits that can bring them to the attention of the appropriate people (Woolgar, 2004) . Hence the focus of this literature is on the technical (information-and value-adding) aspects of performance measurement. It rarely offers a glimpse of 5 Generally speaking, "an accounting amount is defined as value relevant if it has a predicted association with equity market values" (Barth et al., 2001, p.79) 6 By the logic of functionalism, an efficient decision-making process is one that moves rapidly to a unique solution, conditional on current environmental conditions, and is independent of the historical path. The assumption of historical efficiency makes this perspective largely indifferent to the behavioural reality of the micro-processes that are assumed. For example, competition can be assumed to eliminate action that is inconsistent with the logic of survival (March and Olsen, 1989:7-8.) .
the organizational actors who design, operate and promulgate these measurement technologies-or at those who oppose them. Simons' work (1990 Simons' work ( , 1991 explicitly examines why internal control systems shift in and out of top managerial focus. He infers the informational relevance of performance measurement systems not from the point of view of analysts, but from the choices that the organization's timeconstrained top managers make as they select certain control systems over all others for interactive use; that is, their choice of a system with which to personally and regularly involve themselves in subordinates' decisions 7 . Starting with a study of 30 businesses in the U.S. health care products industry, Simons (1991) observed how selectively top managers used multiple control systems. He argues that top managers with a clear strategic vision select a control system that addresses the firm's key strategic uncertainties and devote frequent and regular attention to it-they use it interactively. Other formal controls complement interactive controls in a more low-key fashion;
they draw attention only when pre-set limits are breached and management intervention is required (diagnostic controls). Simons' theory yielded a number of propositions about the workings of multiple-control systems. A notable conclusion is that top managers use multiple control systems interactively during short periods of crisis, but select only one control system for interactive use under normal circumstances. Simons' work (1990 Simons' work ( , 1991 gave rise to much interest in how top management distributes its limited attention among various control subsystems and the consequences that arise once decision-makers have chosen specific control systems for interactive use (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007) . 8 All these studies presume that a logic of functionalism guides top management's control selection as they make a rational choice to focus their attention on certain control systems in specific strategic settings, based on their assessment of key strategic 7 Simons (1991) defines interactive use as follows: "Based on the amount of top management attention directed to a control system, a management control system can be labelled as interactive when top managers use that system to personally and regularly involve themselves in the decisions of subordinates." Simons postulates that when systems are used interactively, four conditions are typically present: 1. The information generated by the control system is important and is on the recurring agenda addressed by the highest levels of management. 2. The control process demands frequent and regular attention from operating managers at all levels. 3. Data are interpreted and discussed in face-to-face meetings of supervisors, subordinates and peers. 4. The process relies on the continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions and action plans. 8 Simons (1990 Simons ( , 1991 argues that, as top management's attention is a scarce resource, executives tend to select an existing management system-such as the budget, the project management system, or the revenue system-and monitor it personally to ensure that the firm's goals are achieved. In particular, top management will choose to make a control system interactive if the system collects information about key strategic uncertainties. Simons postulates that top management's interactive use of a particular control system signals to subordinates what the key priorities of the organization are and encourages a continual discussion among them of the underlying data, assumptions and action plans. Hence interactive controls have a powerful signalling and empowerment capacity: They provide impetus to the emergence of new strategies from the grass-roots levels of the organization.
uncertainties. Nothing is said, however, about the processes by which these controls are brought to decision makers' attention or about the people who promote these control systems and compete with other staff groups to gain visibility and voice in the decision-making process.
2.2.The process perspective
From a process perspective, the fate of any performance measurement and control system is radically open-ended and its passage from conception to practice requires assistance (Woolgar, 2004) . New controls cannot just by themselves become part of a broader multiple-control package;
without enablers and enabling conditions they can be marginalised and aborted (Otley, 1980; Cooper, 1981; Cooper et al., 1996; Malmi and Brown, 2008; Malmi & Granlund, 2009) . From this perspective, we ought to be concerned with the processes through which new controls are deployed and the organizational actors and dynamics that enable specific measurement techniques to complement or compete with others (Howard-Grenville, 2007) . These actors operate in a "marketplace" of ideas and issues, where they compete for the attention of key organizational decision-makers (Dutton et al., 1997 (Dutton et al., , 2001 ). They do so by "issue selling" in the early stages of decision making, guiding top management to pay attention to issues, events, developments, and trends that have implications for organizational performance and to understand them in certain ways. Studies in the process perspective focus on why some of these controller groups gain (and others lose) visibility and influence in decision making. They portray the specific processes through which new controller groups come to define the organizational agenda and, by doing so, alter the organization's conception of what problems it faces and how to solve them.
Among such field-based control process studies, two in particular highlight the potential incompatibility of-and substitution effects among-control systems. Dent (1991) and Mouritsen (1999) showcase organizational controller groups who clash over fundamentally incompatible control systems. In both studies, accounting was the 'new' control mechanism that enabled adherents to challenge what came to be seen as old and dated (engineering and operational controls in Dent's work) or elusive and improper (hands-on, tacit production controls in Mouritsen's). In these stories, complementarities between control systems did not seem to play a role; one system had to defeat the other. They also demonstrate how certain controller groups can deploy a control system (such as accounting control) as an 'ammunition machine' (Burchell et al., 1980) in their struggles to gain organisational power and influence. From these studies, it appears that management control system rivalry can be either the result of strategic reorientation or the cause of it. The direction of change is explained with reference to the implications of the particular control system that becomes dominant. In that vein, Mouritsen's study characterises different control systems as representing fundamentally different "versions of what flexibility, innovation and productivity could look like" (Mouritsen, 1999:53) . Management control issues were important because, as Mouritsen argues, they "gradually took on strategy in its totality": questions of the constitution of customers and the boundaries of the firm. Proponents of the "hands-on" production controls called for the implementation of a new costing system, but no strategic change, while the CFO mobilising a rival "paper" control system suggested the new strategy of outsourcing. The CEO adopted the latter; a new control system that gave higher visibility into indirect costs, which could then be made variable by outsourcing certain operations to subcontractors. In Dent's study, a cultural change occurred in the course of a complete organizational reorientation as the company was privatised and the old service-focused operational management culture gave way to a more (March and Olsen, 1989:22-23) . 10 A core premise of the institutional logics perspective is that the interests, identities, values and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded in prevailing institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012:6) . At the industry level, logics are embodied in the common identity of industry players; at the level of organizational actions and decisions, logics provide the formal and informal rules of action and interpretation that guide or constrain actors (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999) .
2.3.The institutional theory perspective
The idea of firms and, in particular, control system advocates seeking institutional legitimacy has a strong explanatory appeal. Assuming that an organisation's survival hinges largely upon its legitimacy, which in turn results from the firm's conformity to the institutionalised rules and norms of its environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) , one can argue that the rise and fall of particular management control systems depend upon their being seen as conforming to cultural myths and symbols in the institutional environment. Sources of public legitimacy typically stem from processes of modernization, usually driven by professions and the state and leading to a homogenization (isomorphism) of organizational practices. In a variant of this theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that organizations will homogenize in form because three institutional sectors-the state, the professions, and the market-create three different forms of isomorphism (coercive, normative, mimetic). Fligstein's (1985 Fligstein's ( , 1987 Fligstein's ( , 1990 ) research on corporate conceptions of control demonstrates that, in addition, the corporation is an increasingly powerful source of rationalization in its own right (Thornton et al., 2012 A weakness of the institutional approach, as originally conceived by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) , was its lack of focus on agency, actors and interests and its acknowledgement that actors may not only reproduce behaviours that are consistent with prevailing institutional logics, but may also innovate and thus transform institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012) . In other words, while these theories can explain the apparent homogeneity and stability of certain organizational forms and practices, they give little clue as to what drives the remaining heterogeneity and change. In addition, institutional theorists paid little attention to how incumbents maintained their dominant positions or responded to threats, especially during periods of crisis and instability (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991: 30) .
Recent institutional approaches place a new emphasis on the tension between competing institutional logics and the role of agency in transforming logics; that is, mobilising logics as part of ongoing power struggles and intermittent change. While March and Olsen (1989) describe variants of rationality, such as the logic of functionalism and the logic of appropriateness, they do not specify how the norms themselves are likely to vary with situations. Friedland and Alford (1991) pointed to this limitation and argued that rationality is a relative concept depending upon an individual's or organization's place in the institutional context. Accordingly, actors can be guided by different rationalities (logics) anchored to different institutional logics, resulting in tension, conflict and change, with "individuals competing and negotiating, organizations in conflict and coordination" (Friedland and Alford (1991) quoted in Thornton et al., 2012:76) . Given contemporary institutional theory's acknowledged responsibility to account for the diversity of actors and practices (Lounsbury, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012) , there is an important opportunity to create a more comprehensive theory of control system selection that attends to both institutional and micro-processual dynamics.
For example, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) The study suggests that institutional logics, once they become dominant, affect control practices by structuring the attention of executives toward the set of issues that are consistent with the industry's dominant logic, whether editorial or market, and away from issues that are not (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999:837 ). It appears, however, that dominant institutional logics do not necessarily displace other logics for good; older logics can reemerge (Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007) and multiple institutional logics may prevail and compete in the same institutional environment. We therefore need theories that can account for actors drawing on competing institutional logics. In such a context, institutional logics alone cannot explain why top managerial attention shifts amongst control practices, but institutional logics combined with the processual and information-content perspectives might give a more satisfactory explanation. This paper attempts to derive such a theory based on a case study in the context of capital management in the financial services industry, where the competition and ongoing controversy between legalistic, rules-based accounting controls and financial, market-driven and market-simulating risk controls suggest an environment of competing institutional logics.
These contests-and how they are decided-matter. At stake is the control effectiveness of complex financial organizations, as made abundantly clear by recent control debacles in the global financial services industry. A recurring theme in the commentaries on the egregious losses suffered by large financial institutions is the apparent lack of top managerial attention to the financial risk controls. 11 Other commentators suggest that risk models (to the extent they were paid attention to)
actually misguided users about the true risk profile of their investments (Taleb, 2007 ). Yet another group of critics attack rules-based accounting, which failed to provide appropriate market-based or market-simulating valuations of (in hindsight) toxic assets (Kaplan, 2011) . But fair value accounting itself came under criticism, too, for its subjectivity, its overreliance on stylised discounted cash-flow models and "fictional" constructs dependent on critical assumptions about orderly markets (Bromwich, 2007; Power, 2010) . The controversy suggests a fundamental, little understood tension between financial risk models and emerging practices of accounting (fair value or otherwise), both within financial firms and between the institutional logics that these controls draw on. In the next section, I examine these tensions. We will want to know not only who wins such a contest, but why.
Accounting, risk management and competing institutional logics in the financial services industry
"Full fair value" measurement is the valuation practice of "marking" asset and liability values to actual or (in the absence of comparable prices) theoretical market prices, which have to be obtained from financial market-simulating models. Fair value measurements for certain asset and liability classes have been propagated by accounting standard setters for more than 50 years (Ryan, 2008) . Fair value accounting is "a financial reporting approach in which companies are required or permitted to measure and report on an ongoing basis certain assets and liabilities (generally financial instruments) at estimates [emphasis added] of the prices they would receive if they were to sell the assets or would pay if they were to be relieved of the liabilities. Under fair value accounting, companies report losses when the fair values of their assets decrease or their liabilities increase. Those losses reduce companies' reported equity and may also reduce reported net income" (Ryan, 2008:1) . Ryan notes that fair value advocates have encountered widespread criticism on the grounds that fair values are difficult to estimate, reported losses can be misleading because they are temporary and will reverse as markets return to normal, and (as we saw in the subprime credit crisis) reported losses can adversely affect market prices, yielding further losses.
However, advocates of the fair value logic confidently assert the functional argument, insisting that the relevant question "is whether fair value accounting provides more useful information to investors than alternative accounting approaches. The answer to that question is 'yes.'" (Ryan, 2008:1) Taking a step back from technical detail, Power (2010:198) interprets the rise of fair value "in terms of a contest between fundamentally different conceptions of accounting reliability.
Specifically, a notion of reliability grounded in market-based and market-simulating valuation processes is in competition with an older, transaction-based, legalistic model." He goes on to say, "The idea of fair value accounting" draws on many tenets of finance theory, so much so that he defines fair value as "accounting trying to be finance" as it draws increasingly on the cultural authority and techniques of financial economics (Power, 2010: 203) . Fair value, then, is much more than just a technical measurement convention; for its proponents, it "came to represent a change process which was global in aspiration and was increasingly intolerant of the apparent incoherence of mixed measurement systems," the latter being traditional, transaction-based accounting that only partially accommodated market-based valuation practices (Power, 2010:197) .
In fact, the institutional logic of "fair valuing" has not crowded out traditional, historicalcost-and-accruals-based accounting; rather, a "mixed accounting approach" has long been in practice. Consider, for example, the losses reported at my case site, MultiBank, in 2002.
Accountants valued financial assets using the "lower of cost or market" principle-a combination of the historical cost and market value approaches 12 . The losses that MultiBank's insurance division, EurInsurance, suffered in 2001 were recognized as a result of "other than temporary impairments on investments and the realization of losses from reducing the equity exposure of the portfolio." 13 Like all insurers, EurInsurance used historical cost as the basis for valuing long-term assets and liabilities.
During the early 2000s, this accounting practice came under criticism from banking regulators and financial risk professionals, who advocated the idea of "full fair value" or "market value (mark-to-market) accounting". Rather than applying fair value only partially to the balance sheet, advocates of "market value accounting" would prefer to fair-value the "whole book". Since the early 2000s, bank regulators have encouraged banks to apply this methodology as part of the calculation of their capital adequacy and the development of internal, market-simulating risk 12 "Recognition of an impairment loss on equity securities is recorded if a decline in fair value below the cost basis of an investment is considered other than temporary. Declines in fair value below cost for more than 6 months continuously or which exceed 20% are considered strong indicators of an other than temporary impairment which lead to an impairment loss recognition. Notwithstanding the considerations above, unrealized losses are recognized as an impairment loss when a decision has been taken to sell a security. Financial institutions embraced risk management following the regulatory imperatives to measure the "riskiness" of their portfolios and to set aside adequate (risk-adjusted) capital to absorb unexpected losses (Caruana, 2005) 16 . While traditional accruals accounting had the expertise to determine provisions to absorb expected losses, the requirement to set aside reserves against unexpected losses necessitated an expertise concerned with rare events-"tail-events,"
statistically speaking-that was outside the expertise of accountants. In the wake of the Basel regulatory requirements, banks' demand for financial risk experts was met by an emerging cadre of "quants"-postgraduates with degrees in mathematics, physics or financial econometrics. Newly sprung professional bodies, such as the New York-based Global Association of Risk Professionals, responded to Basel II by designing curricula to meet both its "standard" and the "advanced" measurement requirements, as well as the self-imposed hedging, derivatives and other financial engineering needs of banks.
In sum, it can be argued that the logics of "full fair value" (underlying risk-measurement innovation in banks) and the logics of "accrual accounting" (with its mixed measurement approach 14 The Bank of International Settlements issues and revises the Prudent Valuation Guidance, which reads: "718(c). This section provides banks with guidance on prudent valuation for positions that are accounted for at fair value, whether they are in the trading book or in the banking book. to balance sheet valuations) constitute different, and potentially conflicting institutional logics in the sense that they focus the attention of decision-makers (regulators, managers and analysts) on a certain set of issues and solutions, which may, in turn fundamentally shape decision processes and outcomes (Lounsbury, 2008) . The next section introduces the case study site and the controller groups who arguably enacted these different logics, and came to promote to top management different issues and solutions in the aftermath of a control debacle.
Setting the stage: MultiBank and its multiple-control system in 2002

4.1.Research site and methods
The idea of this case study was born during the field work I undertook as a doctoral student in two financial services firms, with the objective of producing a comparative study of their risk management processes. I chose MultiBank as a study site following a theoretical sampling rationale (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) to form a matched pair with my other research site: both had a reputation of having relatively mature, "leading-edge" risk management practices. Following Ezzamel and Hart (1987) , divisional control is taken here as a subset of a broader organisational control system. I adopt Anthony's (1965) distinction between control process and control systems. The control process consists of the headquarters' activities concerning controlling and governing the division. Control systems are defined here as the information sources and functional areas on which these control activities are based. Simons' (1990 Simons' ( , 1991 definition of management controls emphasizes the importance of the formalised procedural aspect of management controls 18 . My study acknowledges the possibility of the presence of informal controls in divisional control, as defined by Ezzamel and Hart (1987) , but regards informal control as part of the control process, rather than as a separate control system. I found four management control systems at work in divisional control: 1. accounting control at headquarters, 2. risk control at headquarters, 3. accounting control in the division, and 4.
risk control in the division.
4.2.The logics of risk and accounting controls
MultiBank's risk controllers applied the institutional logic of "full fair value accounting" in the measurement of their flagship risk metric, economic risk capital (ERC). In the words of MultiBank's Annual Report, "Regular assessments of mark-to-market revaluations of all balance sheet positions and interest rate scenarios are the basis for these analyses" (MultiBank Annual The language of this definition is strikingly different from that of the annual report: MultiBank's risk controllers described their key metric to internal constituents not as "mark-to-market valuations" but as a measure of "economic value". They also revealed that their valuations were based on the logic of financial econometrics. They calculated an estimate for a critical "unexpected" (not-likely-to-be-surpassed) tail-loss event with a high level of confidence, essentially predicting that there was only a 1% probability that this loss would be surpassed over the next year.
The risk controllers calculated and mobilized this tail-loss estimate to determine their view of the "economic capital needed" to buffer the organization against such a "worst-case" loss.
Hence, ERC was put forward to be compared with the (accounting) capital reported by the accounting function and, depending on the result of this comparison, to trigger action (raise more capital or reduce capital). The risk controllers' choice of language shows how deliberately they drew on the cultural authority of financial economics and how they differentiated themselves from accounting expertise by not using the term "mark-to-market accounting" or any of its variants, even though it was one of the inputs to their econometric modelling. Through their choice of emphasising econometric rather than marking-to-market practices (even though both were required which accorded with regulatory requirements and thus channelled the regulatory logic into internal discussions of capital planning.
As for performance measurement, the accounting controls applied the mixed-measurement (accruals) approach and, under the "lower of cost or market" principle, marked only the short term investments assets of EurInsurance to market values rather than regularly fair-valuing the entire balance sheet, as did the risk controllers. Again, accounting controls drew on the rules-based, legalistic logic of accounting, rather than on the "full fair value" logic.
The resistance of EurInsurance's accountants to the "full fair value" logic reflected an industry-wide institutional logic that preferred the mixed-measurement approach. The Geneva Association, a group of leading insurance company chief executives, asserted that fair-valuing the full balance sheet was "unlikely to result in high quality accounting standards for insurance" 21 .
AIG's then chief executive plainly declared that fair value accounting "has no place in the insurance industry" 22 and AIG chief financial officer Howard Smith argued that "it's easy to say you can value a long-term liability, but in practice, it doesn't always work." 23 At the time of my study of MultiBank and EurInsurance, insurance companies applied a mixed-measurement approach: They fair-valued only their trading assets, available-for-sale securities and derivative assets, applied the "lower of cost or market" principle to financial investments and valued longterm assets and securities held to maturity at cost. Generally, insurance liabilities were not accounted for at current value either Macve, 2000, 2002) .
It thus appears that, by the early 2000s, the stage was set in MultiBank for the meeting of two fundamentally differing control technologies in the discussion of EurInsurance's capital management issues.
Multibank and the control debacle: The story of a crisis
The events of this case study can be grouped into four stages: 1. pre-crisis, 2. crisis, 3.
recovery, and 4. follow-up. These stages were characterised by varying degree of environmental hostility, which rose during the crisis and stayed high throughout the recovery year but had ebbed away by the time of my follow-up visit in 2004 (Figure 1) Follow-up (2004) Business as usual
Pre-crisis (1996-2001)
MultiBank's acquisition of EurInsurance was hailed by analysts and commentators at the These first three years of realising the 'bancassurance strategy' were referred to in the annual reports as a 'merger process' between the Bank and the insurance company. However, integration between the two companies remained low. Interviewed by a bankers' magazine towards the end of this period, the Group CFO voiced a commitment to a decentralised group structure: 'We believe in our structure and the autonomy which it grants to the business units.' Organisational theorists argue that the level of divisional integration can be inferred from the quality of collaboration amongst the organisational units, which is necessary for a unified effort (Lorsch and Allen, 1973) . The bancassurance strategy required such unity of effort but, by the time I arrived at the Bank, the integration was regarded internally as a failure. While the long-term future of the bank and the insurance unit were discussed by a new management team, there was much speculation among managers about several possible (and contradictory) actions in relation to EurInsurance. There was a widespread expectation that MultiBank would either tighten control over EurInsurance or sell it off. In the meantime, a correction in the investment strategy and a reduction of the insurance unit's market risk profile took place. MultiBank's new CEO personally steered and monitored a defensive 'stop-loss' strategy and assumed personal oversight of EurInsurance's investment management department. Given the sense of urgency, the Bank took several measures to limit EurInsurance's autonomy. Two of MultiBank's control functions were active in proposing new forms of control over the division: management accounting ("controlling") and risk management.
Recovery (2003-2004)
Control tightening
This section examines how, in the wake of the crisis, MultiBank's accounting and risk controllers worked to tighten their grip over the troubled business unit. The crisis offered both groups an opportunity to impose their own controlling blueprints on EurInsurance.
The tightening of accounting controls
MultiBank's business units sent profit-and-loss data monthly to the central management accounting function ('Controlling'). EurInsurance, during the years of its semi-autonomy before the crisis, was an exception. Due to the nature of insurance accounting, the insurance unit did not close its accounts monthly, only semiannually.
It was only when the heavy write-downs went through EurInsurance's accounts that (Simons, 1990) :
top managers at MultiBank used it frequently, regularly, on the phone and in face-to-face meetings with EurInsurance's managers. Though 'bancassurance' might have remained unrealised as a strategy, it was succeeding both as a divisional control system and as an integrative device. Deployed in investor communications, risk controls not only signalled that the crisis was passing, but also conveyed a subtler message that an innovative, firm-wide, consistent and homogeneous risk reporting and control framework was being applied in the Group.
The tightening of risk controls
Control system rivalry
The crisis offered challenges and opportunities for MultiBank's various controllers. Both accounting and risk controllers perceived a control failure to which they reacted by making EurInsurance's formal controls similar to those at MultiBank. These accounting and risk controls were used frequently and regularly by MultiBank's top management at the time of EurInsurance's crisis. However, due to the different natures of accounting and risk controls, they were not always in sync. There were a number of fault lines in the multiple-control system. The first arose around the timely recognition of EurInsurance's financial troubles. Second, a contest took place around the measurement and management of the insurance unit's capital adequacy. The third tension concerned EurInsurance's key performance indicator, to be used interactively by MultiBank's managers in divisional control. Repeatedly, the risk controllers challenged the economic rationale behind the accounting controls, but the accountants pushed back. As the implications of accounting and risk controls were contradictory in these decision areas, top management had to choose between the control systems, while the two controller groups competed to remain relevant in highlevel decision making and organisational action.
When to recognise a loss?
The risk control function at EurInsurance had picked up a worsening trend in the firm's equity portfolio well before the losses went through the accounting system. However, corrective action took place only after it became clear that the P&L account had suffered. This apparent disregard of the risk controls in favour of the accounting controls puzzled risk controllers: Risk controllers answered the technical question of loss "recognition" with "marking-tomarket" the equity portfolio, which they did daily. Consequently, the timing of their loss recognition was earlier than that of the accountants. Accounting controls delayed the recognition of the worsening equity market positions in accordance with accounting standards: "Recognition of an impairment loss on equity securities is recorded if a decline in fair value below the cost basis of an investment is considered other than temporary. Declines in fair value below cost for more than 6 months continuously or which exceed 20% are considered strong indicators of an other than temporary impairment which lead to impairment loss recognition." MultiBank's top management was satisfied with EurInsurance's half-yearly performance updates and used divisional accounting reports as a diagnostic control system (Simons, 1991) . Only when the impairments hit the income statement did top management recognize the "problem of EurInsurance".
With the benefit of hindsight, risk controllers were more successful in detecting the insurance company's deteriorating investment performance than the accounting controllers had been. The visibility of the risk controllers increased as they were active in crisis management and successfully communicated the decreasing risk trends to internal and external stakeholders. Risk controls, having been used interactively by top management during the crisis, achieved a level of visibility similar to that of the accounting controls. Risk controllers then set out to keep those controls visible and influential in the forthcoming top managerial discussions about the future of EurInsurance. 
7.2.What capital level is "adequate"?
Capital management-the assessment and monitoring of capital adequacy-became a critical subject in the wake of EurInsurance's financial crisis. The division had to be recapitalised and its capital adequacy had to be monitored frequently and regularly.
The task force set up by MultiBank's risk controllers to investigate various alternatives for controlling EurInsurance going forward identified several possible approaches to the assessment of EurInsurance's capital adequacy. The risk controllers claimed expertise in the capital management area, which, prior to the introduction of ERC calculations, had been considered an accounting issue and a matter of legal (regulatory) compliance. So the seemingly technical questions of loss recognition and equity investment valuation were linked to the social questions of how the credibility of experts was constituted. Paraphrasing Power (1992), MultiBank's top management believed in particular valuations because they believed in those valuers, not the other way round.
The risk controllers came up with the ERC ratio, an 'economic' measure for the continuing assessment of EurInsurance's capital adequacy. It related available capital to ERC, the latter being a proxy measure of the total risk profile. Meanwhile, the prevalent accounting solvency ratio used revenues and growth as the proxy measures for the riskiness of an insurance company.
Due to their familiarity with the ERC ratio, risk controllers in the insurance division welcomed it and started to promote it as a tool preferable to the accounting solvency ratio: 'There is a solvency ratio in place, which is the regulatory requirement; it has to be greater than 150%.
[…] This is the main tool of statutory regulation. However, the market value of 'longer' assets is more sensitive to interest rate changes than that of 'shorter' assets. Under accounting standards, if an insurer increases the duration of its assets, the sensitivity of these assets' marked-to-market value to interest rate changes increases, too, leading to higher volatility in the value of the capital recorded on the balance sheet. The management team of the insurance unit was incentivised based on the division's return on capital; that is, its accounting performance. They could reduce unwelcome volatility surprises in the balance sheet by 'shortening' assets, as those with shorter duration are less sensitive to interest rate changes. But this would go against the implication of the 'economic' controls operated by risk managers. This conflict over the appropriate duration target for EurInsurance's assets shows how risk controls and accounting controls (due to their different institutional logics) had the capacity to direct the attention of decision-makers to different sets of issues and solutions (Lounsbury, 2008 '… the question arises if you want to steer the business from an accounting or an economic perspective.
Following public opinions, it is more accounting driven because of the problems highlighted by the rating agencies in public.'
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It appears that, even though the risk controllers challenged the economic rationale of the accounting control system, they did not challenge its institutional appropriateness.
Discussion
The case study explored the changing context and internal dynamics of a multiple-control system deployed in divisional control. Discussing the study further, I seek to explain why certain control systems became implicated in divisional control at certain times while others were replaced or marginalized. I draw on the content-based, processual and institutional perspectives on multiplecontrol use to interpret the findings.
The content perspective
Previous research has yielded a number of results that appear to answer the question how and why control systems shift in and out of top managerial attention. Simons (1991) observed that at times of increased environmental hostility, top management resorts to using more than one control system interactively and we have evidence from Chapman (1998) controls is underdetermined by the functional rationality of control systems. We therefore need to complement the content perspective with an explanation that accounts for the competition between controllers vying for visibility and voice in decision making.
The process perspective
The accounting and risk controls presented decision makers with different and (in the case of balance-sheet management) conflicting signals at the time of their simultaneous heightened visibility. The apparently technical differences between the controls expressed tensions between a traditional, legalistic, rules-based accounting expertise and a forward-looking, economics-based and market-oriented risk expertise. As in the brand accounting debate, which also played out between two such expertises (traditional cost accounting versus market-based, forward looking brand-valuation), debates about the right approach to divisional control took place in an "interpretative space" (Power, 1992) where controllers advanced their competing interpretations of EurInsurance's risk profile and capital adequacy. They did this by also advancing their credentials and claims to provide the applicable measurement technology (Power, 1992) . The projects of risk and accounting controllers to deploy different tools in controlling EurInsurance got tied up with their competition for visibility and voice in top managerial decision making, which led to a series of credibility contests. Like the contestants in the brand-accounting debate in the wider institutional arena of standard setting, controllers tried to construct trust in their expertises by engaging in strategies to "credentialize" themselves and to contest the credibility of their competitors (Power, 1992 (Power, , 2003 . In the end, the fate of their claims was contingent, not on how well their chosen methods addressed the problem of EurInsurance's capital adequacy, but rather on their capacity to generate top managerial acceptance and a widespread consensus among both internal and external stakeholders.
Experts can mobilize various credentializing strategies 58 . Following Power's definition, I
identify these strategies as "the rhetorical means by which narrow technical arguments can be attached to, and made to represent, a broad field of interest[s]" (Power, 1992:51 ). MultiBank's risk controllers and accountants deployed very different credentializing strategies.
Risk controllers: Credentializing strategies
First, risk controllers contested the economic rationale of accounting controls. They established a task force within MultiBank to draw top management's attention to the unsuitability of EurInsurance's pre-crisis accounting controls as a basis for divisional control. In effect they deployed credibility by realism, pointing out that existing controls were ill-equipped to reflect economic reality. They also drew on the cultural authority of financial economics; notably, though, without offering an explicit and detailed description of the underlying inputs and modelling assumptions of their own ERC methodology. Such withholding of detail could be justified on confidentiality grounds or on the grounds of "not making it too complicated for others"; either way, it had important consequences. Risk controllers could shield their "full fair value" expertise from criticism by not revealing it fully and, at the same time, reinforced their credibility by mystique (Power, 1992 They constructed a narrative of the crisis which disagreed with the risk controllers' post mortem. While the latter faulted EurInsurance's (accounting) controls on the grounds of their lack of timeliness, accountants argued that the division's reporting practices lacked detail and were too infrequent. During the crisis, they swiftly moved a new reporting template into the divisional control space that was more aligned with MultiBank's top managers' experience of how financial services firms worked. The "bancassurance" control template gained credibility by association: It stressed points of similarity between the performance drivers of the insurance business and the performance drivers of other divisions that top management understood well. The "bancassurance" template was a useful rhetorical and technical device that provided MultiBank's top management with a much-needed sense of familiarity and control.
In the capital management area, accountants mobilized the solvency ratio, which, in their eyes, had gained credibility by acceptance as an established regulatory metric. The third and perhaps most crucial strategy involved positioning the solvency ratio (and other accounting disclosures) as the basis of broader performance management and strategy discussions. They argued that if accounting numbers are important for external users, then surely they must also be relevant and credible for internal decision makers: 60 'This is what we publish, so it is important.'
Accountants were thus able to promote the credibility of their controls by appearing to represent a broad constituency of stakeholders which included regulators, analysts, rating agencies and the business press. The power of this strategy (credibility by representation) is to deprive the opposition of a voice (Power, 1992) ; to be against accounting controls is to be against the business itself.
On balance, even risk controllers accepted the accountants' rationale: 'If we ask ourselves, 'can we act against the accounting standards?' the answer is no, the analysts and the rating agencies would not recognise [accept] that.'
In sum, the EurInsurance crisis opened up a field of contestability over the division's capital management and performance measurement. But these technical questions provided an interpretative space in which claims to expertise were promoted and contested. In the end, management made a choice about the basis of interactive divisional control, but just as the choice was not based on pure functionality, neither was it determined by the credentializing strategies both sides deployed. Rather, I argue that, in order to sort the controllers' arguments, top management seems to have deployed the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1999) , which highlighted the institutional legitimacy of the accounting controls over risk controls in the insurance environment.
The institutional perspective
MultiBank's risk controllers appeared to have learnt that the use of risk controls in response to a crisis depends not only on the economic conditions but also on whether existing institutional logics legitimate risk management as an appropriate response. The apparently technical parameters of the debate about EurInsurance's capital management expressed tensions between the accountants and the risk experts, for whom accounting practices such as the mixedmeasurement approach and the solvency ratio were questionable. The risk controllers contrasted accounting-based capital management with their own econometrics-based and market-oriented valuation expertise.
From an institutionalist perspective, these observable practice variations resulted from different controllers' appeal to-and compliance with-fundamentally different institutional logics. The solvency ratio reflected the insurance regulatory logic, which was then prevalent in the EU. It drew on accounting standards, which promoted the mixed-measurement approach to asset valuation. The bancassurance reporting template reflected the same accounting rationale as well as a banking-style view of the organization's performance drivers and cost structure. In sum, accounting controls drew on the institutional logic of accounting as a legalistic, rules-based practice while risk controls drew on the cultural authority of financial economics, with ERC reflecting the full fair value logic.
How did MultiBank's top managers reconcile these conflicting institutional logics?
Drawing on contemporary institutional theorists who examine the consequences of competing logics on organizational action (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; Lounsbury, 2008; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Creed et al., 2010) , I argue that a logic of appropriateness complemented top management's logic of functionalism. In other words, top management's use of capital-management-oriented control systems, which functionally addressed the key strategic uncertainty during the crisis-capital adequacy-was also conditional on the institutional appropriateness of these control systems. As pressures in the external environment changed, the definition of institutional appropriateness shifted as well, and top management saw fit to use different control systems once the crisis was over.
Given that the regulation of capital adequacy in the insurance industry builds on accounting technologies such as the solvency ratio, accounting controls clearly possessed institutional appropriateness. MultiBank's risk controls, however, complied with a fundamentally different regulatory regime: that of banking capital adequacy. Their 'economic' view was legitimate in the banking world and was used as an important input in top managerial discussions about how to reduce risk within EurInsurance, and how to measure and communicate the decreasing risk trends during the crisis, as the capital adequacy of the entire group was at stake. However, post-crisis, in the day-to-day management of the division, this view conflicted with the accrual accounting view seen as appropriate in the insurance world. As for the discussions of EurInsurance's capital adequacy, performance measurement and balance sheet management, risk controllers had to give way to the greater institutional appropriateness of the accounting controls.
Conclusion
Adding an institutional reading to our understanding of interactive control system selection over time provides a richer explanation of what happened at Multibank than the content perspective may suggest. Simons (1990 Simons ( , 1991 argues that it is top management's knowledge of key strategic uncertainties that motivates their choice of interactive control systems. But behind the various control systems there are active controller groups who, in competition for executive-level visibility, promote their solutions for organizational control problems. The choice of interactive controls can be influenced by the 'credentializing strategies' deployed by the controlling groups vying for visibility and voice in decision-making, a competition that can be won by demonstrating higher institutional appropriateness.
This analysis drew on a relatively recent trend in institutional theory, which investigates fields "comprised of multiple logics, and thus, multiple forms of institutionally-based rationality" (Lounsbury, 2008:354) . In the specific case of MultiBank and its division's crisis, the surveyed "field" became specific too, and the delineation of "logics" was situated in time and space:
Europe's insurance crisis. Drawing on Ocasio (1997) ,'s attention-based view of the firm, this study outlined relevant institutional logics that played a role in the explanation of top management's interactive control choice. These logics were enacted by MultiBank's controllers to direct the attention of decision makers: on one hand, mark-to-market accounting (mobilised by risk controllers) and rules-based accruals accounting coupled with the logic of insurance regulation (adopted by accounting controllers) on the other hand.
The study showed that multiple logics can create diversity in practice even within a single organization as controllers vie for the attention of top management by identifying different problems and solutions. In particular, ERC and the ERC ratio emerged as technologies responding to the then growing institutional logic of mark-to-market accounting in banking, and the accountants mobilised the solvency ratio (regulatory logic) in the discussions of EurInsurance's capital management. The multiple logics also created diversity in organizational solutions (e.g.
how to set duration targets for EurInsurance's balance sheet and how to measure the performance of its managers) that evoke the image of the organizational garbage can (Cohen et al., 1972) , in which the sorting mechanism was a combination of functional rationality and institutional appropriateness.
It has to be highlighted that the apparent dominance of institutional appropriateness in top management's interactive control selection occurred in the specific discussions about
EurInsurance's post-crisis future. We need further studies to investigate how pervasive institutional logics can be in the design, promotion and take-up of multiple controls in organizations, and how top managers respond to these via their control selection. On one hand, multiplicity can create huge ambiguity, leading to logic blending and the continued emergence of new practices (Lounsbury, 2008) , which was not observed in this case. On the other hand, organizations may respond to the same institutional logics in multiple ways: as forcefully argued by Oliver (1991) , firms may deploy diverse strategic responses to institutional pressures that vary in active organizational resistance from proactive manipulation to passive conformity. Further research is needed to study and reconcile the radical open-endedness of the institutional logics themselves with the emerging institutional understanding of multiple control systems and interactive controls use.
